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Introduction
Despite serving as an indispensable input for numerous ubiquitous products, from powerful permanent magnets in hard discs to phosphors in TV screens, Rare Earths were virtually absent from public debate until a few years ago. China, which is accounting for more than 90 per cent of worldwide Rare Earth production, changed that recently. The People's Republic tightened its export restrictions on the metals repeatedly from 2005 onwards.
Hence, prices have increased continuously and skyrocketed in 2011. Under the impression of these events, more general discussions about the dependency on raw material imports emerged in the US and the EU alike (U.S. Department of Energy, 2011; EU Commission, 2010) .
Chinese market power is neither exogenous nor static. If prices are sufficiently high, new suppliers can enter the market, in particular in case of Rare Earths, whose deposits are found in many parts of the worlds. China's export restrictions increase prices in the rest of the world and encourage the expansion of supply. Thus, tight export barriers today can reduce market power in the future. When interpreting China's power on Rare Earth markets, these dynamics have to be taken into account.
In this paper, I investigate to which extend China is able to exert power on Rare Earth markets until 2020 using its trade barriers and which welfare effects they imply.
Exerted market power is measured as the price increase relative to a free trade situation.
A dynamic partial equilibrium model allowing for endogenous investment in capacities and a disaggregated representation of the mining sector is developed. It represents the physical life cycle of the metals, from the extraction of ores to recycling or disposal. The model is calibrated using a novel dataset on Rare Earth mines. Scenarios are simulated to assess the influence that China's most important policy parameters have on exerted market power: export quotas, export tariffs, and domestic production.
Partial equilibrium models of metal markets can be distinguished into two groups.
The first is econometric models including Fisher et al. (1972) ; Fisher and Owen (1981) ; Slade (1980) and, more recently, Agostini (2006) . This branch of literature proposes aggregate behavioral equations for supply, demand, price formation and recycling. The parameters are estimated econometrically and tested statistically. A second group of studies calibrates partial equilibrium models on metal markets (Winters, 1995; Demailly and Quirion, 2008) . A recent example of this approach is Lanz et al. (2013) . They develop a model for the global copper market taking into account transportation costs, recycling, and a disaggregated processing sector. It is used to assess carbon leakage induced by sub-global sectoral climate policy. These models do not consider endogenous capacity investments. This paper makes three main contributions. Firstly, it applies a novel dynamic partial equilibrium model to metal markets. Secondly, it provides the first quantitative assessment on China's market power on Rare Earth Elements. Thirdly, it explicitly analyses the dynamic aspects of market power in a raw material sector.
Model simulations indicate that China's power on Rare Earths market is a temporary phenomenon. Its persistence differs by the type of Rare Earths, however. Assuming for status-quo export barriers to remain in place, Chinese market power on Light Rare Earths vanishes around 2016. Market power on Heavy Rare Earths is expected to endure until the end of the decade. Welfare losses outside China due to the export restrictions are US$ 1.96 billion 1 until 2020.
Altering China's export quotas has strong effects on prices in the short run, but the People's Republic is unable to exert market power in the long run using quotas. Changing export tariffs has weaker but more continuing effects. Expanding production in China crowds out supply from the rest of the world and makes existing export restrictions more effective. The results are robust to many key assumptions regarding demand and supply of Rare Earths. They are affected strongest by demand shocks and unplanned delays while opening new mines in the rest of the world.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the Rare Earth Elements. Section 3 presents China's restrictions on Rare Earth exports. The model is outlined in section 4, its results in section 5. The outcomes of the sensitivity analyses are presented in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Rare Earths in a Nutshell

Basic Properties
This subsection provides an introduction to Rare Earth Elements. It draws heavily from Gupta and Krishnamurthy (2005) Figure 1: Global rare earth production by region in tpa Source: U.S. Geological Survey (2012) up a Rare Earth mine (Hatch, 2012a) . Constructing a mine necessitates substantial sunk costs, which act as barrier to entry (Kessides, 1990) . Rare Earth mining firms usually conclude long-term contracts to sell their output which reduces risks and eases entry.
Recycling plays a negligible role for Rare Earth supply (Du and Graedel, 2011; Schüler et al., 2011) . There is some re-melting of scrap accruing in the production of permanent magnets, but no recycling of discarded products containing Rare Earths on an industrial scale.
The metals are employed in a multitude of industries. Products containing Rare
Earths include many high-tech goods such as Neodymium-Iron-Boron (NeFeB) permanent magnets, catalysts, or ceramic capacitors. (Kingsnorth, 2012) . (Hatch, 2013a) . Figure 3 Hatch (2012b Hatch ( ,c, 2013a illegally in 2008 (Hurst, 2010) . The difference between Chinese and foreign trade statistics fell to 8,000 t in 2011 (Wübbeke, 2013) , indicating a decline in smuggling activities. 
Mining Sector
The mining sector extracts and processes Rare Earths. It consists of an exogenous number of small price-taking firms, which is indicated by printing the sector dotted in figure 4.
Depicting the mining sector on a firm level is particularly useful in the case of Rare Earths because it reflects the large differences between mines in terms of costs, resource stocks, but also the composition of ores.
Mines maximize their discounted profits over a finite time horizon, choosing their extraction of Rare Earths and their expansion of physical capacities. They are assumed to have perfect foresight of the future. Non-Chinese mines are price takers. They are run by small junior mining firms which do not possess market power in the short run.
Mining firms receive revenues from selling Rare Earths and, if available, by-products.
Prices for by-products are exogenous, prices for Rare Earths are endogenous. The share of individual Rare Earth Oxides in a mine's ore is constant. Marginal costs of extraction are assumed to be constant (Agostini, 2006) . The mines receive constant marginal revenues for their output.
Extraction is constrained by the resource stock and the capacity available. Each mine possesses a fixed and known resource stock. Adelman (1990) argues that this assumption needs to be relaxed and endogenous investment in exploration and development of new deposits should be allowed for. The assumption of exogenous resource stocks is not expected to bias the results of this study, however. For a time horizon until 2025, deposits considered in the database are sufficient to satisfy any reasonable demand without running into resource constraints.
The theoretical literature emphasizes the importance of investment costs and endogenous capacities for modeling exhaustible resources sectors (Cairns, 2001; Holland, 2003) .
Considering endogenous investment is particularly important for the Rare Earth sector, where substantial capacity increases can be expected in the next years. In the model, mines can increase their capacities incurring convex investment costs. The investment cost function is calibrated to replicate proposed mine sizes closely (Pothen, 2013) China's Rare Earth production needs to be modeled differently. The mining sector includes some very large producers, in particular the Bayan Obo mine, and is subject to tight and increasing government control. Representing the sector by a number of small, profit-maximizing firms does not appear plausible.
Both the Chinese Rare Earth output and the trade restrictions are assumed to be exogenous throughout the study. Unless specified otherwise, China's extraction is assumed to increase gradually to 150,000 tpa until 2018 and export restrictions correspond to those in 2013.
Two main reasons justify the assumption that China's behavior is exogenous. Firstly, Chinese policy makers have to balance a number of goals when deciding upon Rare Earth extraction and trade policies. These include environmental protection and resource conservation, generation of government revenue, and growth of downstream industries (Wübbeke, 2013; Pothen and Fink, 2013 Fringe producers of Rare Earths active prior to 2012 are aggregated into a representative mine whose output is held constant. The underlying intuition is that an expansion of production would necessitate substantial investment. If such investment cannot observed, no large increases in output should be expected. 
Trade Sector
Demand and Recycling
Rare Earths are used as intermediate inputs in seven applications: catalysts, glass, metallurgy (including batteries), phosphors, magnets, ceramics and other applications. Each application employs different Rare Earths and the respective industries are distributed unevenly across regions. Thus, I model demand as iso-elastic functions specific to application, Rare Earth Oxide, and region. It is calibrated on demand prognoses to account for exogenous increases in demand for Rare Earths. The price elasticity of demand t is assumed to be identical over all applications and regions.
If a good containing Rare Earths reaches the end of its useful lifetime, the metals can be recycled. Currently, no recycling of Rare Earths takes place on an industrial scale (Du and Graedel, 2011) . Costs are prohibitive at current prices and technologies (Meyer and Bras, 2011) . In most simulations, recycling costs are assumed to remain prohibitive until 2025.
The following approach is chosen to investigate how introducing recycling affects China's market power. I assume that products of each application have fixed lifetimes.
After the end of the lifetime, they are discarded and become available for recycling. A recycling sector, modeled as a price-taking representative firm, can retrieve the contained Rare Earths. They incur constant marginal costs which is assumed as part of a scenario.
Data
A novel dataset on Rare Earth mines is compiled to calibrate the mining sector. It encompasses the 17 farthest progressed Rare Earth mining projects outside China. Some of those firms announce that they plan to commence production only by the end of the decade. Not considering less progressed projects should not influence the results heavily.
Data is extracted from feasibility studies prepared by mining companies and filed at stock exchanges in the US, Australia, or Canada. Feasibility studies assess if a project is both technically feasible and economically profitable. They include comprehensive geological data, resource estimations, construction plans for the mine, engineering cost estimates, and some market prospectives (Rudenno, 2009) . Feasibility studies tend to be optimistic in terms of costs and time-schedules (Noort and Adams, 2006; Mackenzie and Cusworth, 2007) but provide disclosed and verifiable data. All firms having cost estimates available before August 2012 are included in the dataset. The iso-elastic demand functions are calibrated to the estimates by Kingsnorth (2012) .
Average prices of 2010 are used as reference prices when calibrating the demand function.
Shares of individual Rare Earths used in each application are taken from U.S. Geological Survey (2011) and assumed to remain constant. 3 I assume a price elasticity of demand of t = −0.3 which grows to t = −0.5 in 2020 to reflect increasing substitutability over time.
2 Despite being a part of the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland is not a member of the European Union.
3 The only exception is the share of Cerium in the application Other. It is increased to reflect the introduction of waste water cleaning technologies heavily relying on Cerium (Kingsnorth, 2012) .
These numbers are consistent with estimates for other metals such as copper (Agostini, 2006) , Aluminum (Fisher and Owen, 1981) , or Zinc (Gupta, 1982) . Price data for Rare Earth Oxides inside and outside China comes from asianmetal.com, a private sector firm supplying metal prices.
Results
Business as Usual Scenario
The first simulation is the business as usual (BAU) It is not evident from figure 7 why the export restrictions are more effective for Heavy Table 4 : Cumulative welfare change by region compared to free trade in billion US$ ∆W r denotes the welfare effect implied by China's export restrictions in region r. It is measured as the discounted Marshallian welfare change until 2020 in billion US$ compared to free trade. A high discount rate of 7 per cent is used to reflect the uncertain nature of Rare Earth markets. The numbers need to be interpreted with great care, in particular those for China. Firstly, because data on extraction costs in China is unreliable. Secondly, because welfare losses caused by the environmental damages from mining Rare Earths, which are particularly high in China, are not accounted for.
China realizes welfare gains of US$ 1.40 billion until 2020 by restricting its Rare Earth exports. The United States, the EU, and the rest of Asia experience welfare losses. The welfare loss in the rest of Asia is the largest (∆W RoA = US$ -1.46 billion). This region is affected strongly because it is the second largest consumer of Rare Earths and because it lacks domestic supply. Interestingly, the other countries region (OtC) benefits from China's export barriers. It encompasses nations such as Australia, Canada, South Africa, and Greenland. Higher prices increase producer surplus in those countries, leading to a welfare gain. Aggregate welfare changes outside China, denoted ∆W Cn , add up to US$ −1.96 billion. The export barriers distort Rare Earth markets and thus lead to inefficiencies. Total welfare losses from trade restrictions sum up to US$ 0.56 billion.
After analyzing the business as usual scenario, the effects of changing China's three most important policy parameters are investigated. The export quotas, the export tariffs and the level of domestic production.
Altering Export Quotas
The following simulations investigate how exerted market power and corresponding welfare effects are impacted by changes in China's export quota. Three scenarios are conducted.
In scenario I, export quotas are reduced to 15,500 tpa (50 per cent less than in the BAU).
In scenario II, they are increased to 46,000 tpa (50 per cent more than in the BAU). BAU is shown to ease the comparison. All other parameters than the export quotas remain at their BAU levels. Simulating different export quotas allows for the following conclusions. Tightening them implies high price increases in the short run and large welfare effects. Growing capacities in the rest of the world render quotas ineffective at some point. This process takes longer for Heavy Rare Earths than for the Light ones. Tighter quotas weaken China's market power in the long run, but when it has almost vanished anyway.
Altering Export Tariffs
The second set of simulations concerns China's tariffs on Rare Earth exports. They reveal Price changes relative to free trade levels are shown in figure 10 for three simulations. 
Rare Earth Supply
Further simulations concern the supply of Rare Earths in China. Production of Rare Earth elements is highly regulated and the Chinese government aims at further tightening its control over domestic supply (SCIO, 2012) . It is reasonable to perceive Chinese Rare Earth production as a policy variable.
Again, three scenarios are presented. Scenario I corresponds to a 25 per cent increase in Chinese Rare Earth output. The production is reduced in scenario II by 25 per cent, both compared to the BAU. Results of the BAU are shown for comparison as well. Export restrictions remain unchanged in all scenarios.
Note that changing Chinese Rare Earth supply also implies a different free trade situation. Therefore, the respective free trade simulations are conducted for all scenarios.
The results do not reveal if expanding or reducing production is beneficial for China, because neither the environmental externalities associated with mining nor the user rents of the resources are accounted for. Higher Rare Earth output in China renders the existing trade restrictions tighter in the short run and crowds out market entry in the long run.
Sensitivity Analyses
Extensive sensitivity checks are conducted to evaluate whether the results are robust.
The first part concerns data and assumptions on supply of Rare Earths outside China. It reflects the inherent uncertainty of data from feasibility studies as well as the lack of data on recycling. The second part focuses on data and assumptions on the demand. 4 .
Parameters Affecting non-Chinese Supply of Rare Earths
Recycling Costs
Hitherto, recycling costs were assumed prohibitive and thus no recycling takes place.
Increasing recycling rates is perceived as an important instrument to reduce dependency on raw material imports, both in the USA and the EU, however (U.S. Department of (Tilton, 1999) , but data availability does not allow to calibrate such a function. One can, nevertheless, conclude that recycling can a have notable limiting effect on Chinese market power if it is introduced soon.
Delays in Market Entry
Extracting and processing Rare Earths involves much less standardized processes than producing other metals. Delays while setting up mines are likely to occur. Previous simulations reveal that market entry of new mining firms is crucial for reducing China's market power. Therefore, I analyze the sensitivity of the results on the assumption that all mines commence production in the year stated in their feasibility studies.
The model is solved per year, thus only discrete delays in years can be simulated. Delays during the market entry of new Rare Earth supplies extend and aggravate China's market power. Assuming for no delays plausibly underestimates Chinese influence on world markets. If delays do occur, which appears realistic, China could exert market power for a longer time than in the BAU scenario.
Investment and Extraction Costs
Investment and extraction costs are calibrated on engineering estimates from feasibility studies. The robustness of the results to changes in costs is assessed using a Monte Carlo
Simulation. Feasibility studies present point estimates, but no information about the distribution of the costs. I introduce a triangular distributed random variable X with a lower limit of 0.75, an upper limit of 1.25, and a mode of 1. I draw n = 1000 samples of X, multiply those with the cost estimates and solve the model. The same approach is used in the other Monte Carlo Simulations in this paper. Costs Demand Table 5 presents the results on the welfare effects in the rest of the world ∆W Cn . It shows the mean, the 2.5 percentile, the 97.5 percentile, and the standard deviation σ for the Monte Carlo Simulations on costs, demand prognoses, and the elasticity of demand t . Column 2 in Table 5 shows results of the Monte Carlo Simulation for investment and extraction costs. 95 per cent of all model runs yield welfare losses between US$ 2.17 billion and US$ 1.89 billion outside China. On average, ∆W Cn = US$ -1.99 billion which is close to the BAU value of US$ -1.96 billion. The standard deviation is US$ 80 million.
The sensitivity analysis indicates that results are not very sensitive to errors in cost estimates. In particular in the 2014 and 2015, the inability of new suppliers to enter the market is more important than the costs. This also explains why welfare effects are not effected strongly.
Parameters Affecting Demand for Rare Earths
Demand Prognoses
The demand functions are calibrated on the prognoses by Kingsnorth (2012) . The robustness of the results to changes in demand is scrutinized in this sensitivity analyses.
A Monte Carlo Simulation is applied. Again, a triangular distributed random variable (lower limit 0.75, upper limit 1.25, mode 1) is assumed for, n = 1000 samples are drawn and multiplied with the demand prognosis. In some cases, demand shocks yield negative δp LREO w,t . This phenomenon resembles what was already found when assessing changes in quotas. Export restrictions encourage investment while they are binding, but yield higher capacities than under free trade.
Depending on the demand shocks, these capacities can become big enough that China possess negative market power: prices of Rare Earths outside China are lower than they were under free trade.
∆W Cn is also comparatively sensitive to demand estimations. Column 2 in table 5 reveals that the 95 per cent confidence interval ranges from US$ -2.48 billion to US$ -1.84
billion. The standard deviation σ is US$ 150 million.
The sensitivity of prices and welfare effects to demand shocks is a reasonable result.
Demand for Rare Earths is inelastic and thus exogenous changes in demand impact market outcomes strongly. The shocks can seriously affect China's capability to exert market power, both strengthen and weaken it.
Price Elasticity of Demand
The last Monte Carlo Simulation investigates the robustness of the results to the assumption that the price elasticity of demand grows t = −0.3 to t = −0.5 in 2020. It is conducted analogously to the previous ones. n = 1000 samples are drawn from a triangular distributed random variable (lower limit 0.75, upper limit 1.25, mode 1), multiplied with t and the model is solved. interval ranges from US$ -2.06 billion to US$ -1.88 billion, the mean is US$ -1.97 billion.
All are close to ∆W Cn = US$ -1.96 billion in the BAU scenario. The standard deviation of 0.05 is small.
Conclusions
Rare Earth Elements are crucial inputs for many high-tech industries and Europe, the US, as well as Japan are dependent on importing them from China. This paper quantifies the market power China can exert on Rare Earth markets until 2020 using its export barriers and calculates the corresponding welfare effects.
A dynamic partial equilibrium model for metal markets is developed. It allows for a disaggregated representation of the mining sector and endogenous investment in capacities.
The model is calibrated on a novel database on non-Chinese Rare Earth mines. It is, to the best of my knowledge, the first dynamic partial equilibrium model applied on a metal market. Furthermore, this paper presents the first numerical study on Chinese market Two policy conclusions can be drawn from the results of this paper. Firstly, market forces will plausibly erode Chinese power on Rare Earth markets until the end of the decade. All attempts to introduce recycling, to increase resource efficiency, or to foster substitution need to take this into account. Shortsighted measures relying on high prices levels are likely to be fruitless. Secondly, power on raw material markets is not permanent, but sluggish investment in mining capacities opens up windows of opportunity for nations to influence prices. This calls for a long-term approach in raw material policies. Affected firms, for example, should diversify their inputs to avoid being dependent on a small number of suppliers.
